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Dispute Resolution Commercial Transactions
Along the Belt and Road: Creating Fair and
Consistent Judgments
SARA ZOKAEI†
For over forty years, China has promulgated national policies of opening-up and
cooperation with other nations. Over the past eight years, China has been expanding its
efforts to uphold these policy goals via the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s global
infrastructure project. With this increase in international economic activity and commercial
transactions, China has recognized the need for judicial reform to better serve the legal
needs of foreign parties. Given China’s preference for peaceful cooperation, arbitration,
and mediation, reform was necessary to cater to the needs of foreign parties who prefer
litigation.
In parallel with the Belt and Road Initiative, China has expanded its domestic dispute
resolution mechanisms to provide broad legal resources for Belt and Road transacting
parties. China has outlined its commitment to provide a fair, predictable, and law-based
business environment for international parties in a series of opinions issued by the Supreme
People’s Court of China. Further, China has forged key legal instruments to support its
commitment to provide fair and consistent court judgments: (1) establishment of the
International Commercial Courts; (2) issuance of BRI-specific guiding cases, and (3)
commitment to expanded application of the principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of
foreign judgments.
While China’s extensive domestic judicial reform, to some extent, has been consistent with
its promulgated policies and Belt and Road goals, the vagueness of the Supreme People’s
Court opinions outlining the reforms still present distinct logistical challenges to achieving
fair, predictable, and consistent court judgments. As a result, Belt and Road parties choosing
to litigate their international commercial disputes may face hurdles in their pursuit of fair
and predictable legal protections in court.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1978, the beginning of the Deng era, the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”) has pursued extensive economic reform and committed to the policy of
opening-up to promote global economic development in the People’s Republic
of China (“China”).1 Since 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) has been
at the core of this endeavor. In 2013, China announced its plans to implement
the BRI, a global infrastructure development project and key manifestation of
China’s commitment to the policies of opening-up and cooperation.2 The BRI is
the CCP’s modern attempt at revitalizing the spirit of the ancient Silk Road and
accelerating global economic development through Chinese principles of “peace
and cooperation, openness and tolerance, mutual learning and reference, and
mutual benefit and win-win.”3 Comprised of the figurative “Belt”—i.e., landbased economic corridors—and “Road”—i.e., maritime trading routes—the
project is essentially a conglomerate of trade corridors that geographically span
from China through Europe, the Middle East, eastern Africa, and the rest of
Asia.4
Central to efficient facilitation of cross-border economic activity is access
to legal recourse in the event of a dispute. The sheer breadth of facilitating
commercial transactions across countries of varying economies and legal
systems creates fertile ground for international disputes.5 Foreign parties
transacting along the Belt and Road need to know that they have access to fair
and enforceable legal protections. Cognizant of these varying dispute resolution
preferences and faced with a potential surge in complex disputes, China has
developed a legal framework that gives international businesses broad access to

1. See Albert H. Y. Chen, Legal Thought and Legal Development in the People’s Republic of China 19492008 7 (Mar. 28, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=1369782.
2. See Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road (issued by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Mar. 2015) (China) [hereinafter Visions].
3. Zuigao Guanyu “Yidai Yilu” Jianshe Tigong Sifa Fuwu He Baozhang de Ruogan Yijian (最高人民法
院关于人民法院为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的若干意⻅) [Several Opinions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the Construction of the “Belt and Road” by
People’s Courts], Sup. People’s Ct. No. 9, June 16, 2015 (China) [hereinafter Several Opinions].
4. The belt, alone, consists of six corridors: the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor,
the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the
China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the New Eurasian
Land Bridge Economic Corridor. The road is made of two large maritime routes: the 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road and Polar Silk Road. See MICHELE RUTA, MATIAS HERRERA DAPPE, SOMIK LALL, CHUNLIN ZHANG, ERIK
CHURCHILL, CRISTINA CONSTANTINESCU, MATHILDE LEBRAND & ALAN MULABDIC, WORLD BANK, BELT AND
ROAD ECONOMICS: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF TRANSPORT CORRIDORS 3, 8 (2019),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunitiesand-risks-of-transport-corridors#authors.
5. See Building the Judicial Guarantee of International Commercial Court “Belt and Road”
Construction: An Exclusive Interview with Gao Xiaoli, Vice President of the Fourth Civil Division, The Supreme
People’s Court, PRC, CHINA INT’L COM. CT.: INT’L COM. LITIG. & DIVERSIFIED DISP. RESOL. (Mar. 19, 2018),
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/209/774.html [hereinafter Building the Judicial Guarantee].
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a variety of legal instruments to resolve disputes arising on the Belt and Road.6
More importantly, China has implemented a robust judicial reform scheme to
expand access to courts, depoliticize the courts, and produce more consistent
judgments to better facilitate these commercial transactions.7
Law and legal infrastructure are critical to protect and support foreign
investors who have to navigate foreign regulations and bear the risk of potential
regulatory changes.8 President Xi Jinping has emphasized that governmental
institutions in China should “safeguard national security and social stability,
improve the credibility of the judiciary, enhance people’s sense of security and
satisfaction [and] build a . . . just and standardized legal environment.”9 The
CCP’s expansive control over governmental operations is indispensable to this
pursuit. Through exerting power on courts, the CCP has great ability to reform
China’s legal system in a way that is conducive to economic development and
national goals. Accordingly, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) has issued a
series of opinions that lay out China’s policy goals and strategy to provide
adequate judicial services to international parties transacting on the Belt and
Road. In the initial blueprint for these judicial services, Several Opinions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the
Construction of the “Belt and Road” by People’s Courts (“Several Opinions”),
the SPC acknowledges that the rule of law and judicial functions are critical
safeguards for parties transacting on the Belt and Road.10 The follow-up opinion
clarifies that the expansion of judicial services is aimed at “creat[ing] an
international, law-based and convenient business environment with more
stability, fairness, transparency and predictability for jointly building the Belt
and Road with high quality,” in light of the new era of economic reform.11 With
this goal in mind, China has adopted a number of changes in the judiciary to
further the goals of the BRI.
The three main legal instruments that have been key to providing BRI
transacting parties with greater assurance of fair and predictable court judgments
are China’s international commercial courts, the guiding cases system, and the
principle of reciprocity. While such institutions and reforms are steps toward
providing credible judgments to BRI participants choosing to litigate, the legal
framework still lacks cohesiveness and unity in application of law and
enforcement. Furthermore, although China has made tremendous progress in
adopting more fair and accessible judicial processes for parties transacting on

6. See Opinions on Further Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees by the People’s Courts for the
Belt and Road Initiative, 2019 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw48709/
20200826/0001-48709_127899.html [hereinafter Opinions].
7. Rebecca Liao, Judicial Reform in China: How Progress Serves the Party, FOREIGN AFFS. (Feb. 2,
2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-02-02/judicial-reform-china.
8. RUTA ET AL., supra note 4, at 82.
9. Liao, supra note 7.
10. Several Opinions, supra note 3.
11. Opinions, supra note 6.
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the Belt and Road, the legal system still presents significant challenges to
obtaining fair, consistent, and predictable outcomes for international businesses
who choose to litigate.
This Note first considers the context and policies that led to the
development of the BRI and judicial reform in China. This background is
followed by a discussion of reformed and newly developed dispute resolution
mechanisms available to foreign parties engaging in Belt and Road commercial
transactions. These dispute resolution mechanisms are then analyzed with
respect to the challenges they present to achieving China’s promulgated goals of
providing consistent and fair judgments. This Note ends with a summary of how
the reforms in the judiciary reflect an effort to achieve national policy goals of
fair and consistent judgments but still fall short of these goals with respect to
foreign litigants.
I. ESTABLISHING THE BELT AND ROAD AND THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
For over two thousand years, China’s historic Sino-centric worldview was
center stage in its approach to global governance.12 The CCP’s focus on its core
interests of national security, sovereignty, and development have shaped the
path for how China chooses to engage with the international order.13 However,
the rise of China’s socialist market economy under Deng Xiaoping served as a
sharp turning point in China’s engagement with foreign countries. Beginning in
1979, China implemented vast economic reform measures to move in the
direction of an economy based on free market principles.14 This transformation
ultimately led to increased participation in international engagements—e.g.
signing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
entrance into the WTO, and liberalization of trade barriers—and fundamentally
changed China’s role in the global economy.15 In recent years, China has taken
a strong role in the global economy and accounts for over 14% of the global
GDP.16 This role has enabled China to pursue attractive opportunities to expand
its economy and exert greater influence over the international order. To
effectively carry out these operations, China has promulgated national policies
of opening-up and cooperation with other nations.
In furtherance of these policies, China has used its growing leadership to
bring together nations and facilitate global economic development through the

12. See China’s Approach to Global Governance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/chinaglobal-governance (last visited Jan. 24, 2022)
13. See MICHAEL J. MAZARR, TIMOTHY R. HEATH & ASTRID STUTH CEVALLOS, CHINA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 13–14 (2020).
14. WAYNE MORRISON, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES 4 (2019).
15. Id; see also Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Infrastructure, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 275,
279 (2019).
16. China: Percent of World GDP, GLOB. ECON., https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/China/gdp_share
(last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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BRI. With over 142 participating countries and over 65 domestic economies
involved, the BRI has gained major traction with foreign parties looking to
access new markets.17 Built based on traditional Chinese principles of
cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, and mutual benefit,18 the Belt and Road
platform is clearly aimed at achieving distinct policy goals, but it also seems to
serve as a vehicle to strengthen China’s geopolitical position.19 By implementing
such a platform, China is signaling its willingness to cooperate and work with
other countries.
A. THE FORMATION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE BRI
Consistent with Chinese principles, the BRI is essentially a series of nonbinding contracts formed by a collection of memoranda of understanding
(“MOU”) and cooperation documents between China and participating
nations.20 Each MOU lays out the common goals, including promoting
connectivity of policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, cooperation for common
development, and developing an open global economy.21 The MOUs
subsequently describe the specific areas of cooperation that are targeted by the
parties, such as sustainability development and people-to-people connectivity.22
In contrast to a one-size fits all approach, the flexibility in project governance
enables participating nations to advocate for favorable initiatives, but it also
suggests a commitment to engage in partnerships tailored to the needs of each
participating country.23 Given the highly individualized nature of Belt and Road
relationships, the legal framework reflects this flexible approach. International
parties transacting along the Belt and Road are free to arbitrate, mediate, or
litigate as desired, so long as they comply with their MOUs.24 While this
freedom of choice is consistent with China’s policies of opening-up and
cooperation, until recently, the Chinese legal system made it difficult for foreign
parties favoring litigation to obtain predictable judgments.
Prior to an era of reform commencing in the late 1970s, the CCP retained
exclusive control over all political organs, restricting all means of implementing
17. Countries of the Belt and Road, GREEN FIN. & DEV. CTR, https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-beltand-road-initiative-bri (last visited Jan. 24, 2022); Overview of the Belt and Road Initiative, HKIAC: BELT &
ROAD, https://www.hkiac.org/Belt-and-Road/overview-belt-and-road-initiative (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
18. See Visions, supra note 2.
19. Lutz-Christian Wolff, Legal Responses to China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative: Necessary, Possible or
Pointless Exercise?, 29 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 254–55 (2020).
20. See Visions, supra note 2.
21. See Memoranda of Understanding Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative; see Memoranda of Understanding Between the
Government of the State of Victoria Australia and the Government of the National Development and Reform
Commission of People’s Republic of China on Cooperation within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative.
22. See Visions, supra note 2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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any semblance of Western democracy.25 Traditional socialist thought generally
rejects litigation as a solution to resolving disputes because it disfavors the risk
of creating enemy-like relationships.26 As a result, China gave preference to
arbitration and mediation in settling in legal disputes. Although China had a
court system at the time, the complete lack of independence of the courts from
the political regime was not favorable to parties choosing to litigate. After the
adoption of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1982, the
power of the CCP began to operate within the framework of the Constitution—
replacing the rule of man with rule of law—yet the court system had failed to
reflect the constitutional independence of the judiciary.27 More recently, China
has implemented a series of judicial reforms to create greater fairness, stability,
consistency, and predictability.
B. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
China has acknowledged the need for judicial reform to create a system
more friendly to international parties. China’s court system was simply
incompatible with the changes in society resulting from opening up and
economic reform over the past twenty years.28 Unsurprisingly, international
parties have broad access to arbitration resources across the world and are
typically guaranteed enforcement of arbitral awards in China under the New
York Convention.29 However, in order to effectively cooperate and promote
global economic development, China’s legal system would need to expand its
recognition of dispute resolution mechanisms used internationally. This includes
increased recognition and resources for litigants. Because the BRI framework
allows for transacting parties to litigate, Chinese courts must be able to provide
fair, predictable, and consistent court judgments. Without predictable,
enforceable legal protections in court, the ability to litigate over a BRI dispute
is an empty promise, which may ultimately deter international commercial
transactions.30 In contrast, by providing international businesses with a variety
of fair and predictable legal services, China would reinforce its commitment to
cooperate with parties who prefer different dispute resolution systems.
Another pertinent consideration is that prolonged cooperation for global
economic development requires a legal system flexible enough to endure over
25. Chen, supra note 1, at 1–4.
26. Margaret Y. Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. L. REV. 241, 254 (2017).
27. See Chen, supra note 1, at 9–10.
28. Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 36 INT’L L. 1039,
1040 (2002).
29. China signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards known
as the New York Convention in 1986. Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Implementation of the
“Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” Acceded to by China, SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. (Apr. 10, 1987), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/411/698.html [hereinafter Notice on New
York Convention]; see New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
30. WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 83.

566

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:2

time. Given the projected volume of parties transacting on the Belt and Road,
there is likely to be an influx in cross-border commercial disputes. Therefore,
the judiciary must have the capacity and expertise to handle a large volume and
variety of cases. Without adequate resources to ascertain the appropriate law,
produce consistent outcomes, and adjudicate fairly, China risks suffering
reputational harm among parties preferring litigation.31 In turn, providing fairer
and consistent judicial services across all dispute resolution mechanisms not
only supports China’s policies of cooperation, but it may even attract parties
who resist Belt and Road engagement for fear of facing uncertainty or biased
court judgments in the event of dispute.
While there are examples of foreign jurisdictions achieving significant
economic growth absent a strong legal framework, one school of thought in
economics—that is, the Rights Hypothesis—suggests that a lack of stable and
predictable legal rights generally discourages investment and reduces the
effectiveness of the economy.32 For this reason, a strong, reliable court system
seems like an essential backbone to support BRI transactions. Furthermore,
because the BRI serves to further Chinese national commitments to opening-up
and cooperation with foreign nations, creating a strong legal framework that
supports varying dispute resolution preferences is a core investment necessary
to achieve these commitments.33 By reforming the court system in a way that is
supportive of international litigants, China can instill greater confidence in
international businesses transacting along the Belt and Road and reinforce
China’s commitment to the greater international order.
II. AVAILABILITY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AND CHINA’S
EFFORTS TO EXPAND AND REFORM DOMESTIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS
China has taken a “demand-oriented approach” toward providing legal
services to international parties transacting on the Belt and Road.34 Not only has
China promulgated a commitment to support the development of international
arbitration, mediation, and domestic international commercial courts, but it has
also committed to continuously assess the legal needs of BRI participants and
reform accordingly.35 With the potential to sweep in a wide range of legal issues
from across borders, legal services for BRI transacting parties need to be
supported by institutions with the tools and expertise to apply appropriate laws.

31. Donald C. Clarke uses the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China prior to reform as examples of states that
have achieved significant economic growth in the absence of a “well-functioning legal system.” See Donald C.
Clarke, China: Creating a Legal System for a Market Economy 2–3 (GWU Legal Stud., Research Paper, No.
396, 2007) (describing the dependency of well-functioning economies and willingness of parties to utilize court
on the capability judicial systems).
32. See id. at 2.
33. See Several Opinions, supra note 3.
34. Opinions, supra note 7.
35. Id.
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Given the variety of dispute resolution preferences among participating parties,
China has been active in expanding the scope of reliable legal instruments
available to BRI participants. More specifically, China has been catering to the
needs of parties who prefer litigation by implementing a variety of court reforms
to provide fair and consistent adjudication in Chinese courts. This is evidenced
by the establishment of international commercial courts, the issuing of BRIrelated guiding cases, and expanded application of the principle of reciprocity in
the enforcement of foreign judgments.
A. ACCESS TO BRI ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVICES
To align with the Chinese principles of harmony and policies of
cooperation, China endorses using arbitration and mediation to minimize
adversarial relations and resolve disputes quickly and efficiently.36 As a
signatory of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) since 1987, China enforces
judgments awarded via arbitration under the principle of reciprocity.37
Therefore, all international businesses whose countries are signatories of the
agreement are entitled to enforcement of arbitral awards in China regardless of
the jurisdiction in which the award was rendered. The certainty of enforceability
of arbitral awards is further addressed in the Notice of the Supreme People’s
Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China, in which the SPC explicitly states
that in the event of conflict between the New York Convention and China’s Civil
Procedure Law, the New York Convention will prevail.38 In other words, foreign
parties whose home countries are signatories to the New York Convention are
guaranteed enforcement of their arbitral awards. Because 92% of BRI
participating countries have ratified the New York Convention,39 the
predictability and consistency associated with arbitration creates an attractive
dispute resolution choice for BRI transactions.
One popular forum outside mainland China that provides high quality
arbitration services for BRI transactions is the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”). Known for the independence of its judiciary,
common law system, and expertise in handling commercial disputes, the
HKIAC holds a strong reputation for providing quality arbitration services.40 In
anticipation of the rise of international commercial disputes arising from Belt
and Road transactions, the HKIAC has established the Belt and Road Advisory
36. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC GUIDANCE NOTES ON RESOLVING BELT AND ROAD DISPUTES
USING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 2 (2019).
37. Notice on New York Convention, supra note 29.
38. Id.
39. Why HKIAC for Belt and Road Disputes, HKIAC, https://www.hkiac.org/Belt-and-Road/why-hkiacbelt-and-road-disputes (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
40. Vincent Connor, HKIAC Announces Dedicated ‘Belt and Road’ Resources, PINSENT MASONS (Apr.
27, 2018), https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/hkiac-announces-belt-and-road-resources.
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Committee, which consists of infrastructure, finance, construction, and maritime
experts.41
Expanding on the use of non-adversarial dispute resolution methods, BRI
parties can also enforce international settlement agreements under the U.N.
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation
(“Singapore Mediation Convention”). The Singapore Mediation Convention
provides a framework for enforcement of international settlement agreements
from resolved international commercial disputes.42 China, along with forty-six
other countries, signed the agreement in 2019.43 By signing on to this agreement,
China continues to recognize the need for consistent application of cross-border
commercial settlements without fundamentally abandoning its preferences of
peaceful cooperation. As a result, if parties want to avoid resolving their disputes
in China, they are free to do so without fear of their settlements being denied
enforcement in China. While these arbitration and mediation services are
nothing new and do not constitute any sort of domestic legal reform in China,
they nevertheless provide an avenue for fair and reputable dispute resolution
services to BRI participants choosing to wholly avoid resolving a dispute in
China.
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINA INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURT
A major signal of China’s commitment to reform the Chinese legal system
to better serve the needs of international businesses transacting along the Belt
and Road is the establishment of the China International Commercial Courts
(“CICC”). As an organ of the SPC, this branch of the judiciary began operating
on June 29, 2018 and consists of two courts: the Xi’an court—that is, the forum
for disputes arising on the Belt—and the Shenzhen court—that is, the forum for
disputes arising on the maritime silk road.44 To accommodate all legal needs
resulting from Belt and Road transactions, the CICC is intended to be a “onestop” forum.45 As a “one-stop” forum, the CICC provides arbitration, mediation,
and litigation services specifically for international commercial disputes.46
Given China’s preference for arbitration and the ease of enforcing arbitration

41. Id.
42. See G.A. Res 73/198, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation (Dec. 20, 2018).
43. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Rep. of China, China Signs the United Nations
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Aug. 8, 2019),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201908/20190802891357.shtml (China).
44. Malik R. Dahlan, Dispute Regulation in the Institutional Development of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank: Establishing the Normative Legal Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PROMOTION OF EFFECTIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 133 (2019);
Building the Judicial Guarantee, supra note 5.
45. Notice of the General Office of the Supreme People’s Court on Determining the First Group of
International Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Institutions Included in the “One-Stop” Diversified
Mechanisms for Resolving International Commercial Disputes, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Nov. 13, 2018).
46. Id.
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awards in China, the arbitration services provided by the CICC are unsurprising.
However, the new litigation services seem to serve as a true manifestation of
China’s commitment to provide more expansive, internationalized judicial
services to foreign parties. In light of the historic concerns revolving around the
consistency, fairness, and predictability of litigating in China, the CICC’s
framework appears to move toward addressing these concerns.
Although the SPC retains independent judicial power under the Chinese
Constitution, the independence of the judiciary remains in the court, not the
individual judges and committees which comprise the court.47 Judges are
appointed by the National People’s Congress (“NPC”), and thus serve as an
important instrument of policy in China.48 Accordingly, the decisions and
judgments of individual judges are subject to review. With this overarching
control in mind, to truly reflect the policy of cooperation embodied by the BRI,
it is necessary to have processes in place to ensure that judges who are
adjudicating international commercial disputes use their unfettered discretion to
apply the appropriate law in any given case. The Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of International
Commercial Courts (the “Provisions”) provides the blueprint for rules and
regulations that guide judges on how to adjudicate international commercial
cases and determine which laws apply.49 The creation of the International
Commercial Expert Committee and BRI-specific guiding cases are two key
resources for CICC judges that help promote fair and consistent judgments.
1. Creation of the International Commercial Expert Committee for
Ascertaining Laws
Given the complexity of making judgments involving foreign parties, the
SPC created the International Commercial Expert Committee (“ICEC”) to help
guide judges to ascertain appropriate international laws and issue fairer
rulings.50 The committee, selected and appointed by the SPC,51 consists of
Chinese and foreign experts who have extensive experience in international
commercial law, trade and investment, have high international influence, and
have a reputation for being ethical and fair.52 The committee serves to support

47. China’s Judicial System: People’s Courts, Procuratorates, and Public Security, OLE MISS,
https://olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/chnjudic.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
48. Id.
49. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of
International Commercial Courts, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (June 27, 2018), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/
1/219/208/210/817.html [hereinafter Provisions].
50. See the Decision on the Establishment of the International Commercial Expert Committee of the
Supreme
People’s
Court,
SUP.
PEOPLE’S
CT.
(Aug.
24,
2018),
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/235/243/index.html.
51. See Working Rules of the International Commercial Expert Committee of the Supreme People’s Court
(for Trial Implementation), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., Article 5 (Nov. 21, 2018), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/
1/219/208/210/1146.html [hereinafter Working Rules].
52. See id. at art. 2.
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judges by providing expert knowledge on international and domestic laws of
their own jurisdictions.53 When a court needs to apply foreign law, the judge
should rely on the expertise provided by the committee.54
China has vowed to strengthen the ICEC as a resource since its
establishment in 2018. In the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court
Regarding Further Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees by the People’s
Courts for the Belt and Road Initiative, the SPC states the goals of increasing
the scope of the committee, increasing the number of foreign representatives,
and leveraging the expertise of committee members in adjudicating cases.55 In
line with China’s relationship with the HKIAC, the SPC has also stated the
commitment to add expert members from the HKIAC to the ICEC.56 Overall,
the addition of this committee not only displays China’s commitment to
cooperation through increased use of foreign law experts in Chinese courts, but
it also may be seen as a check on the CCP’s overarching control of judges. In
other words, the existence of the ICEC holds judges accountable for using
foreign law experts when applicable because not doing so would appear
inconsistent with China’s policy of cooperation. In addition to the resources the
ICEC provides in promoting fair outcomes, judges in the CICC have access to
further guidance furnished by the guiding cases system.
2. BRI Guiding Cases for Creating Consistent Judgments
Similar to case law, “guiding cases” are gold standard cases that judges can
turn to for guidance when adjudicating cases with similar fact patterns.57 While
the authority of guiding cases does not rise to the level of case law, the creation
of guiding cases is particularly significant given the history of the Chinese
judiciary. Traditionally, the SPC had no authority to create case law or engage
in quasi-legislative conduct because such conduct interferes with the lawmaking
authority of the NPC.58 As a result, courts are bound to adjudicate in accordance
with the Constitution.59 However, the development of judicial precedent has
been contemplated since 1987, and the SPC began to experiment with such a
system starting in 2004.60 In 2005, the SPC listed a case law-type system as a

53. Opinion Concerning the Establishment of the Belt and Road International Commercial Dispute
Resolution Mechanism and Institutions, GEN. OFF. CTR. COMM. COMMUNIST PARTY CHINA (June 2018),
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/210/819.html.
54. Id.
55. Opinions, supra note 6.
56. Id.
57. Mark Jia, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2213, 2213
(2016).
58. Fengping Gao, China’s Guiding Cases System as the Instrument to Improve China’s Case Guidance
System, Which Includes Both Guiding Cases and Typical Cases, 45 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 230, 237 (2017).
59. Shucheng Wang, Guiding Cases and Bureaucratization of Judicial Precedents in China, 14 U. PA.
ASIAN L. REV. 96, 101 (2019).
60. Jia, supra note 57, at 2218–21.
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policy objective for the court.61 With wide variation of economic and social
development across China, the production of consistent judgments among
similar cases across the nation proves to be difficult.62 Consistent with China’s
continuing scheme of judicial reform, in 2010 China finally took a step forward
in trying to remedy these discrepancies and provide another instrument to help
produce more consistent judgments.63
The purpose of guiding cases is to support the lower courts in addressing
statutory ambiguities and move toward more unified application of law across
China.64 The cases are to “summarize experience in adjudication work in a
timely manner, guide the adjudication work of courts at various levels, unify the
scales of justice and standards of adjudication, regulate judges’ discretionary
power, and fully realize the guiding function of typical cases in adjudication
work.”65 The process of giving effect to guiding cases requires that a Guiding
Case Recommendation Form be submitted, along with the case to be
adjudicated, to the Office for the Work on Case Guidance of the Supreme
People’s Court.66 Following the review and acceptance of the case by the SPC’s
Adjudication Committee, the case is distributed to each high people’s court and
made public by announcement in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, in
the People’s Court Daily, and on the SPC’s website.67 The limitation on these
cases is that they cannot serve independently as a source of law—that is, there
must be a statutory hook.68 While these cases do not have binding authority in
the way that case law does, in effect, guiding cases are said to have de facto
binding authority.69
Although this reform is not specific to advancing the BRI, the role of
guiding cases with respect to the BRI has gained greater attention after the
issuance of six Belt and Road cases. Guiding Case No. 107 through Guiding
Case No. 112 all provide guidance for judges resolving disputes arising from
Belt and Road commercial transactions. For example, in Guiding Case No. 107,
which involves a dispute over a purchase contract between a Singaporean and
German company, the case holds the applicable international law that governs

61. Id. at 2218–19.
62. See WANG LIFENG, CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT: THE NECESSITY AND FUNCTION OF CHINA’S
GUIDING CASES SYSTEM 2 (2013), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/08/CGCPEnglish-Commentary-9-Professor-Wang.pdf.
63. See generally Detailed Implementing Rules on the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court
Concerning Work on Case Guidance,” STANF. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (June 12, 2015),
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/sgg-on-prc-detailed-implementing-rules-provisions-case-guidance
[hereinafter
Detailed Rules].
64. Jia, supra note 57, at 2214, 2221.
65. LIFENG, supra note 62, at 2.
66. Detailed Rules, supra note 63, at art. 6.
67. Id. at art. 8.
68. Jia, supra note 57, at 2232.
69. Gao, supra note 58, at 236.
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the commercial conduct of the parties shall apply.70 In the absence of an
identifiable governing law, the law agreed to in the contract shall apply.71 In this
specific case, because the contracting parties were organized under countries
that are part of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (“CISG”), and the application of the CISG was not expressly
excluded in the contract, the law of the CISG was applied.72 In another example,
Guiding Case No. 108, which concerns a contract for the carriage of goods by
sea between a Chinese and Danish company, the SPC held that the principles of
fairness prescribed in China’s contract law apply even in cases when there is an
applicable special law—in this case, maritime law.73
Given the difficulty of ascertaining applicable laws in cases concerning
international business entities, these cases are key resources for judges to look
to when determining how to interpret and apply the appropriate law in
adjudicating disputes over international commercial contracts. Furthermore, the
addition of these BRI-specific Guiding Cases demonstrates China’s efforts to
create more consistent judgments and provide some level of predictability as to
how similar cases are likely to be adjudicated. Notwithstanding the contractual
terms between foreign parties, the BRI-specific cases also provide examples of
the SPC acknowledging and applying appropriate international laws, further
promoting stability and consistency in the Chinese judiciary. China’s
recognition of international law is in itself a significant step toward providing
foreign parties with a sense of the legal system’s credibility. When placed in the
context of the BRI, China more firmly exhibits its commitment to providing fair
judgments for international businesses.
C. INCREASED ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS BASED ON
RECIPROCITY
Built on the same principles used to enforce arbitral awards rendered in
foreign jurisdictions, Chinese Civil Procedure Law (“CPL”) permits judgments
made in foreign jurisdictions to be enforced in China under the principle of
reciprocity.74 Codified under Articles 281 and 282 of CPL, enforcement of a
foreign judgment will be allowed pursuant to an international treaty or under the

70. See Helan di Sen Ke Qiufan Bo Yejin Chanpin Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhong Hua Xinjiapo Youxian
Gongsi Guoji Huowu Maoyi Hetong Guoji Jiufen An (德国蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司与中化 国际
（新加坡 有限公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷案) [ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products GmbH v. Sinochem
Int’l (Overseas) Pte. Ltd., A Dispute Over a Contract for the International Sale and Purchase of Goods], Sup.
People’s Ct. Guiding Case No. 107, Feb. 25, 2019 (China).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Zhejiang Longda Stainless Steel Co., Ltd. v. A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, A Dispute Over a Contract
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GUIDING CASE NO. 108 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2019) (China).
74. [The Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of
the Nat’l People’s Cong., June 27, 2017, effective July 1, 2017), art. 281–82, 2017 FALÜ HUIBIAN [hereinafter
CPL].
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principle of reciprocity, so long as Chinese laws and policies are not violated.75
The principle of reciprocity is the concept of acceding to recognition of awards
or judgments made in foreign jurisdictions based on that jurisdiction’s reciprocal
recognition of awards and judgments made by China.76
To enforce a foreign judgment based on reciprocity, the SPC must first
review and issue an order for the judgment to be enforced.77 This is important
because unlike arbitration the judgment may not be enforced immediately,
which prolongs and makes more difficult judgment enforcement for the
prevailing party. The application of such a principle is consistent with Chinese
principles of openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit.78
However, given China’s longstanding preference for non-adversarial dispute
resolution, historically, the SPC has been resistant to enforcing such
judgments.79 Although the CPL has permitted the enforcement of foreign
judgments via the principle of reciprocity, Chinese courts rarely find reciprocity
absent a bilateral treaty.80 For example, Chinese judgments have been enforced
in a number of foreign nations, including Australia, Israel, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom, yet China refused to do the same.81 However, the Belt and
Road seems to have been an impetus for liberalizing the use of this principle.
Since the establishment of the BRI, China has announced that it would take
a more active approach in enforcing foreign judgments on the basis of
reciprocity.82 For example, one major development was the 2019 arrangement
between Hong Kong and the SPC, which allows civil and commercial judgments
made in Hong Kong courts to be enforced in China.83 This is particularly
significant because mainland China rarely enforces judgments of Hong Kong
courts.84 Reflective of China’s goals of expanding access to legal remedies in
75. Id.
76. Alyssa V. M. Wall, Designing a New Normal: Dispute Resolution Developments Along the Belt and
Road, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 279, 295 (2019).
77. CPL, supra note 74, at art. 282.
78. Matthew Sava & Ning Zhang, A New Era of Reciprocity: Trends in Foreign-Judgment Recognition in
China, REID & WISE LLC (Nov. 30, 2017, 6:09 PM), http://www.reidwise.com/blog/2017/11/30/a-new-era-ofreciprocity.
79. Id.
80. See Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Enforcing Foreign Monetary Judgments in China: Breakthroughs, Challenges,
and Solutions in the Context of “One Belt One Road,” GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 105, 106–7 (2020); CAMERON
HASSALL, CLIFFORD CHANCE, BELT AND ROAD DISPUTE RESOLUTION FROM A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 3 (2018),
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2018/06/belt-and-road-disputeresolution-from-a-chinese-perspective.pdf.
81. Huang, supra note 80, at 106–07
82. Opinions, supra note 6, at 3; Nolen Dean Boyer, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
in China, ANDERSON & ANDERSON LLP (Aug. 31, 2018), http://www.anallp.com/index.php/index/article/
aid/339.html.
83. MARTIN DAVID, JO DELANEY, NANDAKUMAR PONNIYA, MINI VANDEPOL, BAKER MCKENZIE, BRI
RISK MITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION OPTIONS IN THE COMING DECADE 31 (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2020/03/bri-report_alb_bakermckenzie.pdf.
84. Zhang Guanglei, Recognizing, Enforcing HK Judgments in Mainland China, CHINA BUS. L.J. (June 12,
2020), https://law.asia/enforcing-hk-judgments-mainland/.
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the context of the BRI,85 the commitment to a more expansive use of reciprocity
is further evidenced by three main actions of China: signing the Hague Choice
of Court Convention and the enforcement of two foreign judgments based on de
facto reciprocity.
1. Hague Choice of Court Convention
China did not became a signatory of the Hague Choice of Court Convention
(“HCCC”) until 2017, twelve years after it was created.86 This action was
another major signal of effort on China’s part to expand the range of credible
legal instruments available to parties transacting on the Belt and Road. Similar
to the role of the New York Convention in enforcing arbitral awards, the HCCC
seeks to promote international trade and investment through judicial cooperation
and enforcement of court judgments in foreign jurisdictions by enabling
contracting parties to designate their choice of court.87 The HCCC is an
international legal framework for enforcing foreign judgments obtained under
choice of court agreements.88 By endorsing and expanding judicial cooperation,
China’s participation in the HCCC allows BRI parties to litigate in different
countries with greater assurance of enforceability in China.
2. De Facto Reciprocity—Kolmar Case (Enforcement of a Singapore
High Court judgment) and Liu Li Case (Enforcement of a California
Judgment)
Although there are no clear criteria for what constitutes “reciprocity”
between China and a foreign nation, the SPC has issued two landmark opinions
enforcing foreign judgments, which ultimately suggests that judges are capable
and willing to enforce foreign judgments based on de facto reciprocity. The first
landmark case, Kolmar Group AG, A Case of an Application for the Recognition
and Enforcement of a Civil Judgment of the High Court of Singapore, is a case
in which the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing enforced a judgment of the
Singapore High Court on account of de facto reciprocity.89 The facts are as
follows: Kolmar Group (“Kolmar”), a Swiss petroleum product manufacturer
and distributor,90 had contracted with Jiangsu Textile Group Import & Export
Co. Ltd. (“Jiangsu”), an international trading company for clothes, toys,
electromechanical equipment and raw materials based in China.91 The parties
85. Boyer, supra note 82.
86. Sava & Zhang, supra note 78.
87. See generally Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, HCCH No. 37.
88. Id.
89. Kolmar Group AG, A Case of an Application for the Recognition and Enforcement of a Civil Judgment
of the High Court of Singapore, Typical Case 13, STAN. L. SCH.: CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/belt-and-road/b-and-r- cases/typical-case-13.
90. Kolmar Group AG, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/company/7321338Z:SW (last
visited Jan. 24, 2022).
91. Jiangsu Textile Industry Group Import & Export Co Ltd, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
profile/company/7902537Z:CH (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
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had entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to a dispute arising from a
purchase agreement between the parties.92 When Jiangsu failed to perform under
the settlement agreement, Kolmar brought a suit in the Singapore High Court
and the court made a judgment in favor of Kolmar.93 However, because
Jiangsu’s operations were based in China, Kolmar applied to the Intermediate
People’s Court of Nanjing to enforce the foreign judgment in China.94 Under
CPL Article 282, the judgment may be enforced pursuant to a treaty between
Singapore and China, or reciprocity, neither of which had been acceded to at the
time.95 However, the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing considered a
judgment rendered by itself in 2014, which had subsequently been enforced by
the Singapore High Court.96 Given the recognition of a Chinese judgment in
Singapore, the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing determined that
reciprocity had been established de facto and recognized the Kolmar judgment.97
The underlying principles of the Kolmar decision are significant in the
context of the BRI because the opinion is aimed at facilitating trade and
investment between Singapore and China through the BRI.98 As a result, Kolmar
has been coined a key case in encouraging lower courts to apply reciprocity in
BRI cases, and it also displays China’s recognition of the need to engage in
judicial cooperation to further its economic motives.99 Similar to the Kolmar
case, in 2017, China recognized a judgment rendered by a U.S. court in the
absence of a treaty or arrangement of reciprocity.100 Although the United States
is not a BRI target country, the following case is an example which illustrates
China’s growing liberalization of enforcing foreign judgments, as well as its
growing reputation as a nation committed to providing fair and predictable legal
protections.101
In Liu Li v. Tao Li et al. for Recognition and Enforcement of a Civil
Judgment of a Foreign Court (“Liu Li”), the suit, first brought in California
Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, concerned the transfer of equity
of JiaJia Management Inc. and the misappropriation of consideration for its
shares.102 Defendants Tao Li and Tong Li entered into a contractual relationship
with Liu Li, in which the defendants were to transfer 50% equity interest in JiaJia
Management Inc. to Liu in exchange for consideration in the amount of

92. Kolmar Group AG, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments in China: The Liu Case and the “Belt and Road”
Initiative, 37 J.L. & COM. 29, 39 (2018), https://doi.org/10.5195/jlc.2018.152.
97. Kolmar Group AG, supra note 89.
98. See Huang, supra note 80, at 116–17.
99. Id.
100. Brand, supra note 96, at 30.
101. Id. at 48.
102. Id. at 31; Liu Li v. Tao Li et al., for Recognition and Enforcement of a Civil Judgment of a Foreign
Court, (Wuhan City Interm. People’s Ct. June 30, 2017) [hereinafter Liu Li].
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$150,000 USD.103 Shortly after Liu paid the defendants $125,000 USD, the
defendants “disappeared with the money” without transferring the shares.104 Liu
sued for the return of her funds, prejudgment interest on the funds, and court
costs.105
The court entered a default judgment for Liu, and Liu applied directly to
the Intermediate People’s Court in Wuhan, Hubei, where the defendants own
property.106 The judgment was given effect on June 30, 2017, based on three key
factors. First, the applicant provided evidence of precedent in which “an
American court has recognized and enforced a civil judgment of a [Chinese
court].”107 Second, the ruling did not “violate the basic principles of the laws of
the People’s Republic of China and the sovereignty, security and public interest
of the People’s Republic of China.”108 Third, the Wuhan court had jurisdiction
over the defendants due to the location of their property in Hubei.109
While these are the first foreign judgments to be enforced in China on a
basis of de facto reciprocity, China’s acceptance of these judgments ultimately
illustrates the ability of foreign jurisdictions to establish reciprocity absent an
international agreement. Although reciprocity does not guarantee enforcement
of foreign judgments, the SPC’s most recent opinion on judicial services and
guarantees for the BRI addresses reciprocity and calls for gradual promotion of
the principle.110 The opinion states:
[The courts] shall positively explore and strengthen regional judicial
assistance . . . and promote the mutual recognition and enforcement of
judgments rendered by countries along the “Belt and Road.” Under the
circumstance where some countries have not concluded judicial assistance
agreements with China, on the basis of the international judicial cooperation
and communication intentions and the counterparty’s commitment to offering
mutual judicial benefits to China, the people’s courts of China may consider
the prior offering of judicial assistance to parties of the counter party,
positively promote the formation of reciprocal relationship, and actively
initiate and gradually expand the scope of international judicial assistance.111

The current rules and application of reciprocity are vague, but the increased
attention on the principle and extended use of de facto reciprocity, on the whole,
suggests a step forward toward predictability in enforcement. If China continues
on this path, the expanded use of this power will ultimately have a major impact
103. People’s Republic of China Recognizes Commercial Judgment Entered by California Superior Court,
WILSON ELSER: INSIGHTS (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.wilsonelser.com/news_and_insights/insights/2972peoples_republic_of_china_recognizes_commercial.
104. Liu Li, supra note 102.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Several Opinions, supra note 3.
111. Id.
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on the BRI, because it will enable foreign parties to litigate in their home
country, should they so choose, without fear of not having their judgment
recognized and enforced in China.
III. CHALLENGES PURSUANT TO COURT JUDGMENTS
It is evident that China has undertaken extensive efforts to transform the
legal system to be more international business-friendly and facilitate disputes
arising from transactions along the Belt and Road. Despite these efforts, the
vagueness of the SPC opinions governing the reforms presents a distinct set of
logistical challenges to achieving fair, predictable and consistent judgments.
This ultimately leaves foreign parties who choose to litigate vulnerable to
potentially unfair judgments in Chinese courts.
In Several Opinions, it is stated:
[The judiciary] shall implement the legal principle of legal equality in a
comprehensive manner, uphold the equal protection of the lawful rights and
interests of Chinese and foreign parties, and make efforts to effectively
maintain the regional cooperation environment for fair competition, integrity,
and harmony and win-win . . . the people’s courts shall follow unswervingly
the socialist road of rule by law with Chinese characteristics and actively carry
out international judicial cooperation.112

The necessity of providing legal equality to further economic development
is becoming increasingly important, and the CCP is aware of this. However,
without substantive rules that effectively guide institutions in achieving these
goals, these plain statements hold little credibility in the eyes of those affected.
As commonly seen in many of the BRI-related opinions issued by the SPC,
China does not provide clear meanings for what constitutes seemingly
cooperative terms such as “legal equality,” “win-win,” or “socialist road of rule
by law.”
These vague and idealistic sounding assertions may be advantageous to
China, by giving courts interpretive flexibility to avoid adjudicating or enforcing
judgments when the outcome will not benefit China or its people. On the other
hand, this vagueness also presents great potential for inconsistent judgments,
which operate to the detriment of international businesses that choose to litigate
their BRI-related disputes. Without a clear understanding of how these
principles precisely operate in court, China may undermine its commitment to
safeguard BRI participants and create a fair and predictable business
environment for foreign parties. Currently, there are two broad categories of
challenges based on the vague standards in the SPC opinions: the potential for
bias in the CICC and the SPC’s process of enforcing a foreign judgment.

112. Id.
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A. POTENTIAL ISSUES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURTS
The Provisions characterize the establishment of the CICC as serving the
purpose of providing an impartial forum for international commercial cases
arising from the Belt and Road, which “equally protect[s] the legal rights and
interests of Chinese and foreign parties.”113 The addition of these courts in itself
is a major development for China, but the unclear scope of jurisdiction, the
vague guidance in application of law, and the overarching control of the CCP
presents potential barriers to impartiality and equal protection for foreign parties
who want to make use of the CICC.
1. Unclear Scope of Jurisdiction
Under Article 2 of the Provisions, there are five types of international
commercial cases over which the CICC has jurisdiction.114 Under the definition
of “international commercial case,” the CICC appears to have broad jurisdiction
over commercial cases involving one or more foreign parties regardless of
whether the parties have any affiliation with China.115 In reality, the blueprint
for the scope of CICC jurisdiction contains a number of restrictions and vague
terms that create ambiguity as to what types of cases may be tried by the CICC.
For example, first instance commercial cases where (1) the amount in
controversy is at least 300,000,000 Chinese yuan, and (2) the parties have
submitted to CICC jurisdiction may be tried by the CICC. However, the ability
to submit to the CICC under these circumstances is dually governed by Article
34 of CPL.116 Under Article 34 of CPL, parties to an agreement are limited to
choosing a forum based on where the plaintiff or defendant is domiciled, where
the contract is executed or performed, or anywhere with a connection to the
dispute.117 As a result, the plaintiff would have to know what constitutes a proper
connection to the forum if the other two options are unavailable, yet there is no

113. Provisions, supra note 49.
114. The CICC has jurisdiction over the following cases:
(1) First instance international commercial cases (“Cases”), in which the amount in controversy is at least
300,000,000 Chinese yuan and parties have submitted to CICC jurisdiction
(2) First instance Cases that are subject to the jurisdiction of the higher people’s court and have received
permission to be tried by the CICC
(3) First instance Cases that are whose nationwide impact is significant
(4) Cases for enforcement, review, or setting aside arbitration international commercial arbitration awards
(5) Other Cases which the SPC finds to be appropriate to be tried by the CICC.
Provisions, supra note 49; Lance Ang, International Commercial Courts and the Interplay Between Realism
and Institutionalism: A Look at China and Singapore, HARV. INT’L L.J. (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://harvardilj.org/2020/03/international-commercial-courts-and-the-interplay-between-realism-andinstitutionalism-a-look-at-china-and-singapore.
115. See Provisions, supra note 49; see also A Brief Introduction of China International Commercial Court,
CHINA INT’L COM. CT. (June 28, 2018) http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/195/index.html (laying out the
features, scope of jurisdiction, and definition International Commercial Cases of the CICC).
116. See Provisions, supra note 49; Ang, supra note 114.
117. CPL, supra note 74, at art. 34.
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guidance as to what establishes a connection to the forum.118 Similarly, the
definition of “major impact” under Article 2(3) provides no clarity as to what
would constitute a major impact nationwide. Overall, these ambiguities make it
difficult for foreign parties to know whether they can make use of the CICC as
a forum for litigation, and consequently make the CICC appear less accessible
and less international.119
2. Challenges Among Judges and in Application of Law
Another potential issue is embedded in the guidelines for judges in
applying law. Article 8 of the Provisions guides the application of foreign law
in international commercial cases.120 When choice of law is not provided in the
contract of the parties in dispute, CICC judges are given great latitude to
ascertain the governing foreign law.121 This is reaffirmed by the catch-all
provision allowing judges to ascertain the appropriate law through “reasonable
ways.”122 Understandably, judges need access to a variety of resources to be able
to find and apply the appropriate law for a given dispute. However, there is no
guidance as to when one method of ascertaining foreign law prevails over
another. Furthermore, there is also no clarification as to what “reasonable” in the
catch-all provision means, and thus no clear limit on how judges decide to
discover and apply foreign law. This power is particularly significant in cases
where the outcome would be affected based on the foreign law chosen to be
applied.
As evidenced by the creation of the ICEC and addition of guiding cases,
the SPC has taken great measures to furnish judges with expert knowledge to
make fair, appropriate judgments. Judges are urged to maximize the use of the

118. In short, the CICC has no jurisdiction over cases that are not connected to China. See HOLMAN
FENWICK WILLAN LLP, THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE: DISPUTE RESOLUTION ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD 2
(2018), https://www.hfw.com/downloads/HFW-The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Dispute-Resolution-along-TheBelt-And-Road-August-2018.pdf.
119. See Wall, supra note 76, at 302.
120. Provisions, supra note 49.
121. “If an extraterritorial law shall apply to the case tried by an international commercial court, the court
may ascertain the law through the following ways:
(1) Provided by the parties;
(2) Provided by Chinese and foreign legal experts;
(3) Provided by law ascertaining service institutions;
(4) Provided by expert members of an international commercial committee;
(5) Provided by the central organ of the opposite party who has concluded judicial assistance
convention with China;
(6) Provided by our embassy in the country;
(7) Provided by the embassy of the foreign country in China;
(8) Other reasonable ways.”
See Provisions, supra note 49, at art. 8.
122. Id.
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expert committee in accordance with Chinese policy goals,123 and guiding cases
are a great resource to support court decisions. However, the broadness and lack
of formality in determining when one method presides over another ultimately
opens the door to inconsistent application at the discretion of the judge.
Additionally, there is little guidance as to what extent judges are required to rely
on the ICEC or guiding cases. In the 2018 Judicial Application Report of the
Guiding Cases of the Supreme People’s Court, an SPC release report, the data
showed since its conception in 2010, over one-fourth of the guiding cases have
not been referred to, and only roughly one-third of adjudicated cases have
referred to guiding cases.124 Apart from the vague guidance on judges’ use of
these resources, there is also little guidance on the authority of the ICEC to
intervene should the judge disregard an applicable law. Additionally, because
guiding cases are not sources of law, the authority of guiding cases is also
unclear, ultimately leaving the courts free to continue issuing inconsistent
judgments.
In effect, it seems as though judges are furnished with unfettered discretion
to ignore these resources and determine the outcome of cases based on foreign
laws that were discovered through “reasonable ways.” This is not to say that
CICC judges will and do in fact take advantage of their discretion. However, the
potential for injustice and inconsistency given the lack of limitations or detailed
guidance is simply another consideration for international businesses who want
assurance of fair, consistent case outcomes.
3. CCP’s Overarching Control of the CICC
It seems to be that a broader goal in establishing the CICC is to encourage
foreign parties to conduct business with and through China.125 By providing
adequate legal services for parties regardless of their preferred method of dispute
resolution, international businesses are more likely to feel comfortable engaging
in transactions on the Belt and Road, and China upholds the policies the BRI
purports to achieve. But regardless of China’s promotion of independence and
predictability in the judiciary, the Chinese legal system still lacks meaningful
independence from the political system.126 With the CCP’s overarching control,
the current legal framework in the CICC presents potential for corruption and
political interference in court decisions. This is a vexing issue in courts because
123. Opinions, supra note 6.
124. Chen Luming & Gong Suni, A Short Review of the Case Guidance System of the Chinese Judiciary,
ASIA L. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.asialaw.com/NewsAndAnalysis/a-short-review-of-the-case-guidancesystem-of-the-chinese-judiciary/Index/332.
125. David Holloway, The New Chinese International Commercial Court and the Future of Dispute
Resolution in the Belt and Road Initiative, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA, EUROPE AND WORLD 51, 62 (Lei
Chan & André Jannsen eds., 2020).
126. Id. at 104. Several Opinions, supra note 3. This is based on the principle that the CCP is leader of the
legislature, as well as the leader in enforcing the law. Therefore, although the Constitution is the supreme law of
the land, there is no conflict between the power of the CCP and the power embedded in the Constitution. Chen,
supra note 1, at 10.
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judges in the CICC are effectively chosen by the CCP’s top-down chain political
regime. The lack of a check on the appointing governmental branch ultimately
has the potential to limit the judiciary’s discretion and autonomy to make just
decisions based on rule of law.
CICC judges are appointed by the SPC, and as a branch of the SPC, CICC
judges are ultimately subject to the purview of the NPC and CCP.127 More
importantly, the NPC and CCP’s Political-Legal Committees can interfere and
guide courts on how to handle cases.128 This lack of judicial independence from
the CCP ultimately opens the door to potential corruption. Additionally, Article
5 of the Notice of the General Office of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing
the Working Rules of the International Commercial Expert Committee of the
Supreme People’s Court (for Trial Implementation) holds that the SPC has broad
power to terminate members of the expert committee for essentially any reasons
the SPC finds fit.129 This broad power to terminate at will, like the issues
surrounding the application of law, ultimately leaves the door open to abuse.
Should the opinions of foreign members of the ICEC be unaligned with the
views and goals of the CCP, the SPC may effectively censor the voices of other
nations in the name of attempting to create a fairer and more consistent legal
system.
Another potential issue connected to the CCP’s overarching control is the
qualifications for judges in the CICC. Under Article 4 of the Provisions, the
courts are to be furnished with senior judges familiar with international treaties,
practices, and trade.130 On its face, there seems to be no issue. However, because
CICC judges must currently be Chinese judges and Chinese nationals, they may
carry inherent bias under CCP control. As discussed earlier, the ICEC, to some
extent, holds judges accountable for disregarding the committee when deference
is applicable would publicize partiality. At the same time, there are no
restrictions that prevent judges from ascertaining foreign law based on another
permitted action. Consequently, if judges frequently opt for the latter, the
creation of the ICEC, for the purposes of promoting fairness in judgments would
be diminished. Although somewhat attenuated, it is also worth noting that
members of the ICEC are chosen by the SPC, thus making the comingling of the
CCP and the CICC inescapable.131

127. Keyuan, supra note 28, at 1047–49; see also Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONG. EXEC. COMM’N
CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
128. See Keyuan, supra note 28, at 1048 n.49 (example of the CCP intervening in the courts).
129. Article 5 states that the SPC may terminate the appointment of any committee member “who fails to
continue to serve as an expert member because of personal willingness, physical health or other reasons during
the employment period, or who is not suitable to continue to serve as an expert member due to other reasons.”
Working Rules, supra note 51, at art. 5.
130. Provisions, supra note 49.
131. Wall, supra note 76, at 305–07.
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B. CHALLENGES IN ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
The principle of reciprocity provides international businesses with an
alternative to litigating in China. While it seems easy to simply submit a claim
and demand enforcement in China based on reciprocity, there are three key
procedural elements before enforcement can take effect: (1) China must issue a
judicial opinion; (2) the proposed judgment must be consistent with Chinese
policy, domestic law, sovereignty, and security; and (3) the judgment must be
final.132 Therefore, the predictability of enforcing a judgment when there is
established reciprocity or de facto reciprocity between China and the
adjudicating jurisdiction is not as clear cut as the Kolmar and Liu Li cases made
it out to be.
Even in the presence of a reciprocal arrangement with another country
under the HCCC or other relevant agreements, the SPC must provide a judicial
opinion to give effect to the judgment obtained, and the judgment in question
must be consistent with Chinese policy, domestic law, sovereignty and
security.133 However, given the SPC’s tendencies for issuing opinions with
vague language—for example, “legal equality,” “win-win,” or “socialist road of
rule by law,”134—there is little insight as to whether the SPC can and will
construe certain judgments as violating Chinese policy, sovereignty, or security,
simply to avoid recognizing and enforcing the judgment of a given country.
While there is potential for corruption via the discretion of the SPC to
determine whether a foreign judgment violates Chinese laws and national
interests, the less discretionary issue stems from the ambiguity of the finality
requirement. As promulgated by judicial interpretations, just as multilateral
treaties must be final to be enforced, foreign judgments must be final to be
enforced under the principle of reciprocity.135 The question is who determines
the finality of the judgment?136 Under Chinese law, a judgment is considered
final when the case is unappealable.137 As a result, parties litigating in another
country may experience setbacks from having their opinion enforced in China
because the judgment has not reached the highest possible court in the
jurisdiction making the judgment. In other words, even if the parties have
determined that a judgment from a lower court should take effect in China, the
judgment is insufficient for enforcement in China under reciprocity.

132. CPL, supra note 74; Jie (Jeanne) Huang, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in China: Promising Developments, Prospective Challenges and Proposed Solutions, 14 (Sydney L.
Sch., Research Paper, No. 19/23, 2019).
133. CPL, supra note 74, at art. 282.
134. See Several Opinions, supra note 3.
135. See Song Jianli: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: Challenges and
Developments, CHINA INT’L COM. CT. (Aug. 30, 2018), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/203/1048.html.
136. Huang, supra note 132, at 14.
137. Id.; cf. NEIL A. F. POPOVIC, FOREIGN MATTERS: HOW TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-COURT
JUDGMENTS (2009), https://www.sheppardmullin.com/media/article/725_Foreign%20Matters.pdf (finality is
met when the judgment is enforceable under the law of foreign country it was obtained in).
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Lastly, it is important to remember that all these potential challenges to
enforcing foreign judgments must be viewed from a bird’s eye view, because
the SPC must first determine whether reciprocity actually exists between the two
nations. Although Kolmar and Liu Li suggest de facto reciprocity may be
sufficient to enforce foreign judgments, the thin precedent on what qualifies as
reciprocity under the SPC does not provide adequate assurance that judgments
that may fall within the de facto category will be enforced.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of dispute resolution mechanisms and court reform to
safeguard international businesses transacting on the Belt and Road has been a
great demonstration of China’s commitment to opening up to and cooperating
with foreign nations. China’s recognition of foreign laws and international legal
needs appears to be beneficial to China’s reputation in the international order, as
well as beneficial for international businesses looking to access new markets.
Under the New York Convention and Singapore Mediation Convention, China
offers fair and predictable legal protections by means of arbitration and
mediation. Additionally, the creation of the CICC, BRI guiding cases, and
examples of foreign judgment enforcement under the principle of reciprocity has
demonstrated China’s active role in creating a more credible, consistent, and fair
litigation service.
While the courts in China have been developing in a way that provides
greater access to non-socialist dispute resolution mechanisms, such judicial
reforms have not provided the same level of assurance in court as they do outside
of court just yet. Currently, the expanding framework still appears to inherently
give preferential treatment to parties who arbitrate or mediate. Parties who
choose to litigate face potential issues in inconsistent application of law,
unfairness due to the CCP’s overarching control, and lack of clarity in
enforcement of foreign judgments. Despite China’s efforts to provide extensive
legal resources to BRI parties, without safeguards to ensure consistent
application of law and ease of access to fair legal protections across all dispute
resolution mechanisms available to BRI participants, China may have a difficult
time encouraging participation in BRI commercial transactions for parties who
prefer litigation. More specifically, to some extent, these challenges are hurdles
to China’s stated commitment to “create an international, law-based and
convenient business environment with more stability, fairness, transparency and
predictability.”138 Despite China’s advancement toward the harmonious,
idealistic portrayal of the BRI promoting cooperation and economic
development, the BRI has yet to measure up to these goals. For China to continue
to further its commitment to these policies and retain a credible reputation in the

138. Opinions, supra note 7.
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international order, it will need to surpass the hurdles that stand in the way of
fair, transparent, and predictable legal protections for parties choosing to litigate.

